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ABSTRACT 
This study estimates the value of  policies that would mandare labeling of beef  frcmi cattle 
produced with growth hormones or fed genetically modified corn. At no cost, 85 percent 
of  respondents desired  mandatory  labeling of beef  produced  with  growth  horniones  and 
64 percent of  respondents preferred  mandatory  labeling of  beef  fed genetically  modified 
corn.  Estimates  suggest that  consumel-s would  be  willing  to pay  17.0 percent  and  10.6 
percent  higher  prices for beef  on  average to  obtain information  provided  via  mandatory 
labeling  about whether  the  beef  is  from  cattle  produced  with  growth  hormones  or  fed 
genetically modilied corn. respectively. 
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Unlike most food products sold in a retail set- 
ting, beef  is primarily  sold as a genet-ic com- 
modity with no brand name. Most consumers 
are currently unable to identify specific attri- 
butes  they  desire  whcn  p~~rchasing  beel be- 
cause of  generic marketing  strategies.  Policy 
makers, who are interested in assuring that the 
public has enough information to make an in- 
formed choice, and beef packers, retailers, and 
cattle producers, who are interested in captur- 
ing  additional  profit  by  branding  desirable 
beef attributes, have turned their attention to- 
ward branding and labeling beef products. Of 
interest in this regard is the role of government 
intervention in the beef labeling process. 
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Caswell  and  Mojduszka  suggest  that  the 
costs and benefits of labeling depend on food 
product attributes, which can generally be cat- 
egorized  as  search,  experience.  or credence. 
An attribute is considered a search attribute if 
consurners  can  identify  quality  prior  to pur- 
chase. either through inspection or through re- 
search. An experience attribute is one in which 
consumers can determine quality only after the 
product  is  purchased  and consumed.  In  con- 
trast, a credcncc attribute is one in which qual- 
ity cannot be assessed even after purchase ~nd 
consumption. Several beef characteristics can 
be considered credencc attributes. For exam- 
ple,  Inany  cattle  are produced  with  anabolic 
growth hormones and are fed genetically mod- 
ified (GM) corn. However, consumers have no 
means  of  determining  which  beef  products 
possess the attributes of  "growth  hormones" 
or "GM  corn"  before purchase or even after 
consumption. Several conditions arise when a good, \uch 
as beef.  possesses credence attributes  (Darby 
and Karni). First, consumers never acquire in- 
formation about the product's quality, even af- 
ter repeat purchases. This lack of information 
produces  market  inefficiencies.  Akerlof 
showed  how  the  presence  of  an  information 
asymmetry could  cause the  market to fail by 
causing  low-quality goods to drive high-qual- 
ity  goods  out  of  the  market.  High-quality 
goods cannot capture a premium because con- 
sumers have incomplete information about the 
product. Thus low-quality goods prevail in the 
market.  Secclnd,  private  tirrns  are  unable  to 
signal quality  through  branding because con- 
sumers assume the firms will niisrepresent the 
true quality of the product because there is no 
verification. Consu~ners  will only trust quality 
signals  that  con  be  verified  by  public  certiti- 
cation and governmental involvement. 
Two issues motivate this study. First. con- 
sumers currently have little infor~nation  abo~lt 
quality  attributes  when purchasing beef. This 
lack  of  information, or information  asymnie- 
try,  causes  markets  to  function  inefficiently 
(Antle).  Second, consumers are not able to in- 
dependently judge  the quality of  several  beef 
attributes before  purchase  or after  consump- 
tion. That is, they  are credence attributes. As 
a product attribute moves along the continuum 
from being a search to experience to credence 
attribute, labeling  c;tn  be  increasingly  benefi- 
cial  (Caswell  and  Mojduszka). Because  srv- 
era1  beef  characteristics  are  credence  attri- 
butes, labeling  can play  an  important role  in 
increasing  efticiency  in  consumer  choice  in 
the beet' market. 
In this study we evaluate consumer demand 
for two  mandatory  labeling programs:  a) la- 
beling of beef from cattle administered growth 
hormones and  b)  labeling of  beef  from cattle 
fed  genetically  moditied  corn.' The value  of 
increased information provided via mandatory 
' We  estimate  demand  Ihr  a  mandatory  labelilig 
program  because  of  the  credence  nature  of  the  hecf 
attributes of interest. Caswell listed foul- alternative la- 
beling policies including no labeling  allowed. manda- 
tory  labeling of  all  products, voll~ntal-y  labeling of all 
products,  and  voluntary  labeling  with  a  government 
disclaimer about the safety. Conv~lmers  mistrust private 
labels is assessed by determining demand for 
the  mandatory  labeling  programs  at  varied 
cost increases. Rather  than  evaluating the ef- 
fects  of  the  mandatory  labeling  program  ex 
,vast  with  actilal  market-level  data,  as  de- 
scribed  by  Caswell  and  Mo~duszka  and  em- 
pirically tested by  Teisl, Bockstacl, and Levy, 
we  ex  n??te  evaluate two potential  ~nandatory 
labeling programs  using  contingent  valuation 
(CV) survey  ~nethods.  To  date.  little yuanti- 
tative research has been directed at examining 
consurner  demand  for  labeling  of  beef  with 
these p:trticular  attributes. Results of this study 
should be useful  to policy makers considering 
the  effects  of  mandatory  labeling  policies, 
becf  industry participants interested in  revital- 
izing beel' demand. and cattle ~,roduce~-s  plan- 
ning for future changes in  production  practic- 
es. 
The paper proceeds  with  a review  of  cur- 
rent  beef  labeling  policies  and  previous  re- 
search  estimating  the  value  of  food  product 
labeling. We then discuss two alternative man- 
datory beef-labeling  programs.  A concepti~al 
model  for  estimating  consumer  demand  for 
mandatory labeling is then presented. The next 
section  inclutles  a  description  of  the  contin- 
gent  valuation  method  employed  to  estimate 
consumer demand followed by  a discussion of 
survey  results.  We  conclutie  the  paper with a 
tiiscussion of our findings. 
Current Beef Labeling Policies 
The USDA  has  recently  rnade several volun- 
t;~ry labeling  programs  available  to  the  beef' 
industry.  The USDA  Agricultural  Marketing 
Service  (AMS) administers  a  certified  becf 
program. Under this program, beef can be giv- 
en a specific "certified"  label  if  certain breed 
or quality characteristics are met. Thirty-tive 
s~tch  programs  are registered  with  the  AMS. 
The  most  notable  of  these  certitication  pro- 
grams is Certitied Angus Beef (CAB). In gen- 
eral, these certified programs are aimed at pro- 
(or voluntary) attempts to  signal  quality  of  credence 
goods because of the lack of  verification. As such, we 
are  interested  in  determining  consumer  dernand  for 
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viding  consumers with  information  about 
experience attributes. For example, consumers 
may  not  be  able to tell  whether CAB tastes 
differently  than  non-CAB  before  purchase; 
however. the CAB label provides information 
about product quality that can only be ascer- 
tained  after consumption.  In theory,  this  in- 
formation reduces search costs for consumers 
and increases market efficiency. 
lri  addition to these programs,  the USDA 
FSIS has instituted provisions to allow beef to 
be labeled as certified. organic, natural.  or no 
hormones administered if certain requirements 
are met.  These labels are primarily aimed at 
providing  consumers with  information  about 
credence attributes. At this point, however, all 
such progranis are voluntary. Although a few 
firms, such as Coleman's Natural  and Laura's 
I ,em, have employed these labels, their prod- 
ucts only make up a very small pel-ccr~tage  of 
beef that appears in the market and these prod- 
ucts generally only appear in  retailers located 
in  affluent  neighbol-hoods. Further,  it  is  un- 
common to see these beef products sold in the 
same meat case with non-branded beef, mak- 
ing it difficult to determine if consumer choice 
is driven  by  the  meat label  or dominated by 
choice of  the particular retailer. Because sales 
of these products are limited and market data 
is  held  by  private  firms,  little  is  currently 
known about the impact of these labeling pro- 
grams. 
In  addition to these pre-existing  programs, 
othet- labeling policies have recently been the 
subjcct of debate. One labeling regulation, re- 
cently the  topic  of legislative  activity. would 
require labeling of imported fresh beef  (Food 
Safety lnspection Servicc (FSIS)). Proponents 
of the mandatory "country-of-origin"  labeling 
claim that the program would allow consum- 
ers to make more informed choices when pur- 
chasing  beef.  Because  consulners  would  be 
able  to  identify  certain  levels  of  quality  or 
consistency with a particular country-of-origin 
label, consunler demand  should be improveti 
(National Cattelnian's Beef  Association). An- 
other program. also introduced as legislation 
in  the U.S.  House of  Representatives. would 
require mandatory nutritional labeling of fresh 
meat.  If  passed,  nutritional  labels  similar to 
those currently on other food products would 
be required on all fresh beef. 
Several studies have examined the value of 
nutritional  labeling  programs  and  mixed  re- 
sults wcre found. Teisl, Bockstael. and Levy, 
using scanner data fro111 grocei-y stores, found 
that  the  valuc  of  inforrnalion  provided  by 
brand-specific  nutritional labels was generally 
positive  and  varied  by  comlnodity.  For  ex- 
ample,  the  value  of  nutritional  information 
was  about  $0.50/nionth/household  hr  rnilk, 
about $0.30/month/household  for peanut but- 
ter,  and about $0.09/month/household  for 
mayonnaise.  In  contrast,  M(!jduszda  and Ca- 
swell  found  that  private  nutritional  labeling 
was  generally  ineffective  at  providing  con- 
sumers with sufficient information about prod- 
uct  quality. They  concluded  that  mandatory 
nutritional  labeling  was  necessary  to appro- 
priately  signal  quality.  Using  a  different  ap- 
proach, Mc).jduszda, Caswell, and Harris found 
that consumer preferences and purchasing pat- 
terns  did not change signiticantly after man- 
datory nutritional  labeling was adopted. How- 
ever,  consumers  do not  necessarily  have  to 
increase consumption of  healthier foods for a 
positive value  of  infor~nation  to exist  (Teisl, 
Bockstael, and Levy). 
The impacts of a few bcef labeling practic- 
es have also been examined. Bureau, Marette. 
and Schiavina illustrated  that the welfare im- 
pacts of European beef trade liberalization de- 
pend  on  the  feasibility  of  low-cost labeling 
and the differences in perceived quality across 
countries. Whether the European Union's (ELJ) 
total  welfare would increase should it remove 
its  ban on US hormone treated  beef  strongly 
depends on whether imported  US beef is la- 
beled  and the cost of the labeling.  If  the la- 
beling  were  costless.  Bureau,  Marette,  and 
Schiavina show that the EU could increase to- 
tal welfart: by importing and labeling US beef; 
howcvcr, when labeling costs are positive, the 
welfare effects of  trade liberalization depend 
on consumers' perceptions of the dirference in 
quality between hormone treated and non-hor- 
mone treated beef  and are generally an~bigu- 
ous. Loureiro and McCluskey examined con- 
sumer demand for geographically labeled meat 
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that the geographic  label generated  a positive 
price  premium  for certain levels of  meat qual- 
ity. Latvala and  Kola found that 60 percent  of 
Finish  consurners  were  willing  to pay  a pre- 
mium  for  beef labeled  as  "Finnish  Beef." 
However,  the  remaining  40  percent  of con- 
sumers were not willing to pay a premiurn  for 
the labeled beef primarily  because they were 
satisfied with current labeling practices. 
Alternative Beef Mandatory Labeling 
Programs 
Although the USDA  allows provisions for vol- 
untary  labeling  of beef from cattle  adminis- 
tered  growth  hormones, there  i\  no  require- 
ment  that  beef  be  labeled  as  such.  Some 
estimates indicate that as much as  95 percent 
of all  cattle  in  the  US  are  implanted  with 
growth hormones (Kuchler et crl.). Kenney and 
Fallert  (pg. 23) indicate.  "Scientists  at  the 
World  Health  Organization  and  FDA  have 
concluded  that residues from hormones, when 
properly  administered  in both dose and  meth- 
od, pose  no threat to human health-residues 
are minuscule compared with the levels of  ste- 
roid  hormones  produced  naturally  in  hu- 
mans."  However, not all  consumers agree with 
such  statements.  For  example. a  study  con- 
ducted  by the Food  Marketing  Institute found 
that, when  specifically asked,  50 percent  of 
consumers said  hormones were a serious haz- 
ard.  If consumers are  aware that much of  the 
beef on the  market  came  from cattle  admin- 
istered  growth hormones  and  no label  is pre- 
sent,  consumer  purchases  of beef  may  be 
dampened  because they may  be  uncertain  of 
the  attributes  of the beef they desire  to con- 
sume. This lack  of information could  create 
market  inefficiencies. Even  if consumers  are 
currently  unaware that most cattle are  admin- 
istered  growth  hormones,  the  beef industry 
must be prepared  for increased consumer ed- 
ucation.  If the  beef conwmer remains  unin- 
formed in the long run, a major hacklash may 
be in store when the public becomes aware of 
such  production  practices.  For  example. the 
European  Union  banned  the  use  of growth 
hormones in livestock  production  and  prohib- 
its imports of  beef produced  with growth hor- 
mones  because  of perceived  consumer  con- 
cerns regarding hormone use. 
A related issue surrounding consumer con- 
cern for animal production  practices is the use 
of genetically  modified  grains  as  livestock 
feed. Given the recent press about biotechnol- 
ogy, it  is evident that  some consumer groups 
are unwilling to purchase genetically modified 
foods, despite  the  fact  that  110  scientific evi- 
dence  has  shown  that  genetically  modified 
foods are  harmful to humans. In Europe, retail 
products  containing  GM ingredients must be 
labeled. This is  not  currently the case in the 
U.S., but  if consumer trends  follow those  in 
Europe, mandatory  labeling  of GM  products 
may  become  a  reality  for  U.S.  producers. 
Some research has argued  that mandatory  la- 
beling of  GM foods is needed  in the U.S. be- 
cause of  the uncertainty of  science and  the na- 
ture  of consumer  concerns  (Hadfield  and 
Thomson).  If consumers are not provided  with 
information identifying whether  beef is from 
cattle  GM corn, inefficient purchasing  deci- 
sions may be made. 
A  mandatory  labeling  program  for  beef 
produced  with growth  hormones or  fed  GM 
corn  has  the  potential  to  accomplish  three 
goals:  I)  reduce consumer uncertainty regard- 
ing the perceived  safety attributes of  beef,  2) 
reduce search costs for consumers, and  3)  pro- 
vide more  information, via market  prices,  to 
cattle producers  concerning consumer demand 
for particular cattle production  practices. Giv- 
en current labeling practices. consumers must 
make  some  assumption  about  the  average 
quality of  the beef on the market, as  they cur- 
rently  have  no  other  means  to infer product 
quality.  This situation  produces  market  inef- 
ficacies of the type described  by Akerloff or 
Antle.2 
Before  mandatory  labeling  of  hormone- 
'  An  argument  could  be  made  that  these  animal 
production practices are safe and that introducing man- 
datory  product  labels  might  deceive  consumers  and 
may impede technological adoption (Caswell). Wheth- 
er consumer  concerns  for  issues  such  as genetically 
modified  foods  are rational  and  efficient  is  an  issue 
beyond  the  scope of  this  study  (hee  Stumo:  Smith; 
Schweikhardt and Batie; and Tweeten for a discussion 
of this issue). treated or GM fed beef is serioirsly considered, 
several issues require attention. First, there are 
costs associated with preserving the identity of 
"hormone-free"  or  "GM-free"  beef  from 
farm to  retail  levels. Further costs are associ- 
ated  with  reduced  production  efficiencies 
when  producers  do  not  rely  of  the  aid  of 
growth  hormones  or GM corn  in  cattle pro- 
duction. 'There  are also costs associated with 
monitoring  a  mandatory  labeling  program. 
The cost of  maintaining  a high-quality  moni- 
toring entity to ensure labels are truthfully ad- 
ministered  could be  quite high.  Second, con- 
sumer  demand  for  these  labeling  programs 
must be assessed. If  consumers are indifferent 
about labeling beef produced with growth hor- 
mones or GM corn  and  such a plan  is  insti- 
tuted, a sub-optimal situation may arise. How- 
ever.  if  consumer  demand  for  the  labeling 
program is increased by  an amount larger than 
the  labeling,  segregating,  and  production 
costs. then mandatory  labeling programs may 
be  a beneficial  way  to increase beef  industry 
welfare. Caswell and Padberg suggested eval- 
uating food labeling policies  in  this costhen- 
efit framework. 
Conceptual Model 
To examine the impacts of mandatory labeling 
of  beef  from cattle administered growth hor- 
mones  or fed GM corn, consitler  an individ- 
ual's  utility  firnction shown in  equation  1 
where x is a vector of consumption goods in- 
cluding beef, label indicates the presence of a 
mandatory label (lubel, if  labeled, Itrhcl, oth- 
erwise) which is fixed exogenously, and s is a 
vector  of  demographic  characteristics. In 
equation  I. it  is  assumed  that  the  consumer 
derives utility from the presence or absence of 
a mandatory  label. The consumer maximizes 
utility  subject to a budget constraint: px = y, 
where p is a conformable vector of prices and 
y  is  income.  This maximization  problem 
yields the familiar indirect utility function giv- 
en by  v(p, label, y: s). Of interest here is the 
value  of  the  mandatory  labeling  prograln. 
Teisl, Bochstael, and  Levy and Teisl  and Roe 
discussed  a  "cost  of  ignorance"  measure  to 
estimate the value of  a labeling policy. How- 
ever,  an  important distinction  must  be  made 
between these analyses and the one presented 
here. Specifically, Teisl, Bockstael, and Levy 
and Teisl and Roe discuss situations where the 
value of information had to be separated from 
the  value  of  a quality  change. For  example. 
Teisl.  Bockstael,  and  Levy  used  secondary 
data to examine the value of a nutritional label 
on products in  which a change in quality had 
occurred. In this case, the value of information 
could  not  be  directly  assessed.  Here  we  cir- 
cumvent this prohle~n  by  directly eliciting the 
value of the labeling program. That is, we ask 
consumers their willingness to pay for a man- 
datory label, not for "hormone  free"  or "GM 
free"  beef  .3 
Given current conditions, consumers have 
no  information  about  hormone  or  GM feed 
use.  In  other words, consumers currently de- 
rive the following utility  from beef consump- 
tion,  v,, = v(p, label,,, y; s). Now  suppose a 
mandatory  labeling  policy  is  instituted  such 
that  v, = v(p, label,, y:  s). Following Hane- 
mann  (1991),  the  compensating  variation  or 
maximum  willingness to pay  (WTP) for this 
change in labeling policy  is 
(2)  v(p, Itrbel,. y -  WTP:  s) = v(p, Itrhel,,, y; s). 
The value of  the labeling program  is equiva- 
lently stated  in  equation 3, which  is the dual 
problem  to equation 2. 
(3)  WTP = m(p, Iuhdg. v,,;  S) 
- m(p, label,, v,,; s) 
Where m is the expenditure function. If  v, > 
'  In  this  franlework  it  is  important  to reali~e  that 
utility  is  derived  from the  presence  or absence of  a 
label, not necessarily from the attributes of  "hormone 
use"  or  "GM  feed  use."  We  are not  estimating the 
demand for "hormone-free"  or "GM free"  beef, rather 
we arc interested in the value of a label on these prod- 
ucts. Consumcr willingness-to-pay for "horrnone-free" 
or "GM  free"  beet' is an issue left unanswered by this 
research. See Lusk, Roosen, and Fox  for estimates of 
the  value  "horn~one-free" or "CM  free"  hcef  when 
perfect information about product quality is known. v,, WTP will  be  positive. 'That  is, consumers  (4)  WTP"  = sp + E 
who derive positive  utility from the label will 
be  willing  to  pay  a  premium  for  the  added 
informaticjn.   hi^ WTP  or benetit of  where x is a vector of socioeconomic explan- 
the  labeling  policy,  can  be  colnpared  with  atory variables,  P  is a conformable vector of 
costs of the program.  coefficients,  anci  r  is  an  independently  and 
identically distributed normal error with mean 
Methods and Procedures  zero and variance cr2. Here, WTP:''  is a latent 
variable that  it is not actually observed. What 
To estimate consumer demand for mandatory 
labeling, a CV inail survey was developed. We 
used  a  standard  CV  approach  with  design 
complexity lying between the single-bounded 
(Hannelnan,  1984)  and  double-bounded  di- 
chotomous  choice  (Hanneman.  Loornis,  and 
Kanninen) methods. In the survey, participants 
were asked, "Would  you favor mandatory la- 
beling  of  beef  that  has  been  produced  with 
growth hormones'?"  As a follow-up question 
they  were  asked,  "If  you  responded  Yes, 
woi~ld  you  still prefer the niandatory labeling 
if  it caused a k  increase in  the price of beef?" 
The price. k, was varied from 2 percent  to 20 
percent,  and  consumers ranclomly  received  a 
survey with one of the following price increas- 
es: 2, 5, 10, 15, or 20 percent. Because prices 
of beef  cuts  vary  considerably,  we chose to 
clicit willingness to pay in terms of percentage 
rather  than  absolute  dollar  amounts.  Con- 
structing  the  questions  in  this  one-and-one- 
half  bound  clichotomous framework has  been 
shown to capture most of the efficiency gains 
in  moving  from  a  single-bounded  to double- 
bounded  choice  format  (Cooper,  Hanneman, 
and Signorello). Following this question, con- 
sumers  were  asked  to  respond  to  identical 
cluestions  ahout beef  from an  animal  fetl ge- 
netically  modified  corn. An  informatio~l  sheet 
was  provided to inform  consumers about the 
two production practices. 
To analyze the responses to the aforemen- 
tioned CV questions. we employed a modified 
version  of  the  interval  censored  CV  model 
(Cameron, 1988: Cameron and James) that al- 
lowed for uncensored values of zero WTP l'or 
those respondents who answered No to the ini- 
tial CV question. Assume that a consumer has 
a true WTP for the value of the label WTP*'. 
Further assume that 
is observed from the data is whether a respon- 
dent indicated a WTP greater than or less than 
a  particular  price,  k.  In a  traditional  single- 
bounded dichotomous framework, respondents 
are presented with a price increase, k, and are 
asked  if  they  would  pay  this  amount.  The 
probability of a Yes response is the probability 
that WTP'" > k. Thus if  a respondent answers 
Yes to the CV question. their WTP falls in the 
range of  [k, x]. Alternatively,  a No response 
to  the  CV  question  indicates  a  WTP in  the 
range  of  1-x  k].  The  resulting  likelihood 
function  is  given  in  Cameron  (1988). In  the 
interval-censored  model,  the  mean  willing- 
ness-to-pay  value  is  simply  E(WTP) = .$, 
where x is a vector of the sample averages of 
the independent variables. 
By having consumers responti to our initial 
CV question,  WTP estimates can  be  further 
refined.  Responses to the  initial  CV  question 
restrict  the relevant  range  of  WTP to 10,  XI. 
That is. WTP fhr respondents who answer Yes 
to the initial CV question but No to the follow- 
LIP question  is bounded  by  10.  k] rather than 
1-x,  k]. Further. an individual who responded 
No to the initial CV question has a WTP = 0, 
i.e., the range has been collapsed to their exact 
WTP One can readily  see that  this  approach 
increases the accul-acy of the WTP estimates. 
To  operationalim  our  model  we  define 
three  groups of  respondents:  Group  D, who 
answered  No  to  the  initial  WTP  cluestion- 
these individuals have an uncensored WTP = 
0.  Group D? who answered  Yes  to the  initial 
WTP question and No to the follow-up-these 
individuals  have  a  WTP  from  [O,  k],  and 
Group D, who  answered  Yes  to  both  ques- 
tions-these  individuals have a WTP from [k, 
z]. Given these groups of respondents, the fol- 
lowing likelihood function is formulated: L1r.r.k trnd  Fox: Coti.curncr Drr~~urztl  ,jiir Mutzdcilory Lcrhcling  3  3 
(5)  Log L = 1  log-+ - 
0,  (T 
+ C log (1) -- 
D-.  [k  ;Tx@) 
where 4 and (11 are the standard normal density 
and  distribution  functions.  respectively.  As 
Cameron  (1 988) suggests. the coefficient  es- 
timates in (5)  can loosely be interpreted as the 
marginal  effect  of  xi on  WTI?  Patterson  and 
Duffield  note  that  the  interval-censored  for- 
mulation is simply a reparameterization of the 
typical logit or probit models discussed in Ha- 
nemann  (1984).  The  advantage  to  this  ap- 
proach  is the ease in  which  mean WTP esti- 
mates  and  confidence  intervals  can  be 
calculated. Cameron  (1 99  1) showed that  the 
confidence interval for E(WTP) at significance 
lcvel  ol  is 
(6)  CI, ,?[E(WTP)J  = ip  i-  I,,,?  'X  x' 
1 
where 1  i.:  the  variance-covariance matrix of 
the parameter estimate\. 
Results 
Before administration of the full survey, a pre- 
liminary mailing was conducted to pretest the 
initial survey. Slight lnoditications were made 
based  on these  responses  ancl  2500  surveys 
were  mailed  in  February  2000  to consumers 
in  the 48 continental United States. 'l'wo  hun- 
dred  sixty  six  surveys were retiuned due to 
undeliverable  addl-esses  and 648  usable  sur- 
veys were completed and returned resulting in 
a 29-percent usable  response rate.l Summary 
statistics  of  the survey  respondents  are pre- 
sented  in  Table  1.  A  little  over half  the  re- 
-'The  nailing  list was  purchasecl  frorn  a reputable 
privale company  that  randomly  drew  addresses horn 
telephone white pages. One dollar was included in the 
surveys to  encourage participation. Sending follow-up 
notices to nonresponclents ~vould  lihcly hove  incl-eascd 
tllc  response  rate:  howevcl; monetary  and  logi.;ticol 
cons~raints  prevented such a procedure. 
spondents were female. The average respon- 
dent  was  52 years  of  age with  15  year\  of 
education  and  a  household  income  between 
$50,000 and $59,999 per year.  Table 2  com- 
pares summary statistics of our survey sample 
with the  U.S. population. The sample of con- 
sumers  that  responded  to  our  survey  had 
slightly higher incon~es  and education as corn- 
pared to the  national  statistics.  However. our 
sample of  respondents had roughly  the same 
age, household  size, and number of women as 
does the U.S. population. Any difference5 that 
exist between our sarnple and the IJ.S. popu- 
lation  should  be  taken  into  consideration  if 
generalizations  are to he  made  about policy 
changes. In  the following analysis our model 
estimates  control  for  socioeconomic  factors 
that could readily be manipulated to adjust for 
tlifference  between  our sample and  the  U.S. 
population. 
As indicated in Table  1, 85 percent  of re- 
spondents  indicated  a  preference  fa-  manda- 
tory labeling of beef adrninistcr-ed growth hor- 
mones.  However.  only  68  percent  desired 
labeling aftcr a price increase. Demand for la- 
beling  01'  beef  froin cattle fed  GM corn  was 
lower than that for growth hormones. Only 64 
percent  of  respondents  prel'erred  labeling  of 
beef  from cattle fed GM corn at no price in- 
crease.  This  number  reduced  to 52  percent 
when  a cost  was associated  with  the rnandn- 
tory labeling program. 
Figure  1  shows the percentage of  respon- 
dents who preferred mandatory labeling at six 
price  levels.  As  expected,  Inore  consumel-s 
preferred the mandatory labeling programs at 
no cost as opposed to a price increase. Further. 
demand for labeling generally declined as the 
price of the labeling increased. At every cost, 
demand  for  labeling  of  beef  produced  with 
growth hormones was higher than dcrnand for 
labeling of beef from cattle fed GM corn. 
To quantify the influence of' consumer de- 
mographics on demand for labeling. eqnation 
5 was estimated for each labeling program us- 
ing survival model procedures  in  SAS. Table 
3 reports  two models for each  labeling  pro- 
grani, Model  1 that includes all socioeconomic 
factors and Model 2 that only includes a con- 
stant term (which, by constl-uction of the like- 34  Jourrrcll  c!f  Agric.crltllrri1 rmrl Applird Eronornic~.~,  April 2002 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Survey Respondents 
Std 
Var~able  Definition  Mean,'  1)ev 
Gender  I  it female; 0 ~t male  0.534  0.499 
As  Llge  of  respondent in  years  51.491  15.149 
Education 
Income 
years of  education  15.189  3.246 
8  = less than  12th grade:  12  =  high  school  diploma:  14 = 
some college; 14 = technical school; 15 = associate's  clegrec; 
17 = bachelor's degree; 20 = master's degree; 23 = juris  doc- 
torate; 24 = doctorate 
household income Icvel  6.410  3.726 
I  =  less  than  $1 0.000:  2  =  $1 0,000 to  19,999  . . .  19  = 
4; 180.000 to $180,999; 20 = more than  $190,000 
Child  1  = children  in the household: 0 = otherwise  0.231  0.427 
Beef  number of  times per month respondent consumes beef  9.392  6.291 
Hormone concern  I  = not at  all concerned; 5 = very concerned  4.074  1.151 
GM concern  1  = not at all concerned; 5 = very concerned  3.890  1.270 
Hormone Label  1  = desire labeling ol' beef  produced with hormones; 0 other-  0.850  0.357 
\vise 
Hormone Paylabel  1  = desire  labeling of  beef  proclucecl with  hormones  if  it the  0.687  0.464 
labeling  ca~~sed  an  k  price  increase  in  the  price  of  beeth; 0 
otherwise 
GM Label  1  = desire labeling of beef from cattle fed genetically modified  0.642  0.480 
corn; 0 otherwise 
GM Pnylabel  I  = desire labeling of beef from cattle fed genetically modified  0.5  I  X  0.500 
corn  if  ~t  the  labeling cau\ed  an  h  price  increase  in  the  prlcc 
of  beeth; 0 otherwise 
.' Nu~nber  of responilents  = 648. 
I,  ,,.  . '  '~rtlc~pants  '  randonily  received a survey where k  = 2 pcrcent. 5  percent,  10 percent,  15  pcrcent, or 20 percent. 
lihood function, is the expected  WTP). Esti-  with lesser concern. Although many of the de- 
mates  suggest  that  consumers  with  higher  mographic  variables are statiftically insignifi- 
income are willing to pay a greater amount for  cant, the  WTP estimates  are statistically  dif- 
mandatory  labeling  of  beef  produced  with  ferent from zero. The expected WTP value for 
growth hormones than are lower-income con-  mandatory hormone labeling is about  17 per- 
sumers.  Further,  consumers  that  express  a  cent, which implies that  the  "average"  con- 
greater concern for the safety of hormone use  sumer is willing to pay 17-percent higher pric- 
(on a scale of  1  to 5) are willing to pay more  es  for  beef  to  acquire  information  about 
for  mandatory  labeling  than  are  consumers  hormone production practices. The point esti- 
Table 2.  Comparison of Survey Sample to U.S. Population 
Statistic  Survey Sample  US  Population" 
Median Household Income  $40,000 to $49.999  $38,885 
Percent with College Degree  3770  22% 
Average Age  5 1  46 
Number of  People in  Household  2.63  2.63 
Percentage of  Women  5  3  5 1 
.' U.S. Crn\u\ Bureau,  1998 slatistics. 09,  ?"b  5%  10%  15% 
I'rice Incrrarc  Assorirted with Imbeling 
nuniber ofoh,crval#onr = 645 
Figure  1.  Consumer preference for mandatory  labeling of  beef  from  cattle fed  genetically 
modified  corn and produced  with  growth horn~ones  at various price increases 
Inate is robust to inclusion or exclusion of the 
demographic  variables  as  indicated  by  the 
Model  2  WTP estimate.  Ninety-five  percent 
confidence intervals, calculated using equation 
6, i~uply  that WTP may range from  19.2 per- 
cent to  11.8 percent. 
Consumer demand  for nlandatory  labeling 
of  beef  from cattle fed GM corn  is less than 
that  for hormone  use. Estimates indicate that 
older  and  higher-educated  consumers  have 
higher WTP for mandatory GM labeling than 
younger and less-educated consumers. Further, 
those  consumers  with  greatel- concern  about 
the  safety  of  GM feed  use  express a greater 
WTP  than  those  with  lesser  concern. WTP 
point estimates from both Models  1  and 2 im- 
ply that consumers are willing to pay a 10.6- 
percent higher price for beef  such that infor- 
mation  is  provided  about  animal  feeding 
practices.  Confidence  intervals  indicate  that 
the  WTP  estimates  are  statistically  different 
from zero and range from  12.8 percent to 8.5 
percent for the full  model. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Several beef  labeling programs are currently 
being  employed  as  a  way  to  differentiate a 
market that has historically been dominated by 
sales of generic commodity products. Because 
several beef  characteristics can be considered 
credence attributes, a role for government in- 
volvement in the labeling process exists. How- 
ever, before federal action is taken the benefits 
of  any  particular  labeling  policy  must  be 
weighted  against the costs. Critical in this as- 
sessment is the value of a labeling policy. This 
study provides direct estimates of the value of 
two potential mandatory labeling programs by 
utilizing  responses  to  a contingent  valuation 
mail survey. Specitically, we estimated the de- 
mand  for two  mandatory  labeling strategies: 
labeling of beef  from cattle a) produced  with 
growth hormones and b) fed genetically mod- 
ified (GM) corn. 
In  a survey  of  U.S.  consumers  we  found 
that more respondents prefer labeling of  beef 
produced with growth hormones than labeling 
of  beef  from  cattle fed GM corn (85 percent 
versus 64 percent). Demand  for both  manda- 
tory  labeling  programs  was  sensitive  to  in- 
creases  in  the  price  of  beef  associated  with 
labeling,  segregation,  and  monitot-ing costs. 
Because of the price sensitivity of the demand 
for labeling, it  is important to consider costs 
of  the mandatory  labeling programs. Estima- 
tion results indicate that consumers will prefer 
mandatory  labeling  of  beef  produced  with 3  6  Jo~iri~rrl  r?/'Agric.~~lrr~r~rl  rrrzd  Apldic~rl  Ec.orlorrric.s, April 2002 
Table 3.  Interval  Censored Estimates of Consumer Demand for Mandatory Labeling of Beef 
from Animals Administered Growth Horn1ones and Fed Genetically Modified Corn 
Hormone Labeling  GM Labeling 
Variable  Modcl  I  Model  2  Model  1  Model  2 
Constant  -  '1  545  :@  :!:  :::  17.043:':  .I::':  -  ] 4.2 ] 8:;::': :!:  1 ().6()9* :!:  :% 
(4.363)"  (0.XOO)  (3.503)  (0.513) 
Gender  0.920  -  0.234  - 
(1.145)  (0.873) 
Age  0.002  -  0.047:::  - 
(0.040)  (0.032) 
Income  0.25X4:  -  0.055  - 
(0.633)  (0.126) 
Child  0.124  -  -0.168  - 
( 1.460)  (1.105) 
Education  0.178  -  (,,-;7  1 :::*:i  - 
(0.189)  (0.151) 
Beef  0.093  -  0.056  - 
(0.000)  (0.068) 
Hormone Concern  5.  ,  43:::::: :I:  -  -  -- 
(0.492) 
GM  Concern  -  -  4.077::: .I:<:  - 
(0.35  I ) 
Sigma  1 (),(,5()::::t  *  1 2,373::-:~  :!:  C)  ,  244  4: :I: :I:  I 0.664:l::k:!: 
(0.579)  (0.678)  (0.407  1  (0.472) 
WTP Point Estimate1'  1 7.02%  1 7.04'2  1 0.64'hL  10.6 1%. 
95'k  Confidence Inter\ al  [I  9.23,  14.81  lL  I  18.01. 15.481  11 2.80, 8.461'  1  I  1.65, 9.571 
1-op lihelihood -:  -707.  770.  -  1,145. and -  1.720  li)l- hornione modelh  I  aticl 2 and Ghl n~odels  1  and 2. I-espectively. 
.:.  .,.  .,.  .,. ...  .,.  L,ln',  :;;  ::;  :!;  .  .  reprrwnt  I5 percent.  10 percent. anrl 5  percent levels of  \tatistical  signilicance. rea[lcctively, Number 
of  ot,\crvationa  =  (>-IS. 
,' Nuliihers in  pal-cnthesea a[-c  \tandarcl  err-or\. 
I' WTP is the percentage i~~~,l-c'ase  it1 the price  of beef  rcapondents arc willing to pc~y  for a  nianclatory Inhel. 
, c.  .I  1.  ~~~laterl  at  the mean \illuca ol'the il~depentlcnr  \:~riablcs. 
growth hormones only il' labeling costs cause 
beel'  prices  to rise  no more than  17 percent. 
Further.  consumers will  prefer  mandatory  la- 
beling of beef from cattle fed Gh4 corn it'  121- 
beling costs increase heel' prices no more than 
10.6 percent. 
Res~~lts  of the analysis indicate that signil- 
icant  demand exists for a mandatory labeling 
program  for  beef  udn~inistered  growth  hor- 
mones. However, several issues require atten- 
tion before such a program is strongly consid- 
ered. First. the costs of cattle segregation, lost 
production  efficiencies.  packaging.  and  pro- 
gram  monitoring  rnust  be estimated to com- 
pare  with  the  estimate value  of  the  labeling 
program.  If  estimated costs  increases  are 
greater  than  17  percent.  our results  indicate 
that beef consu~nption  will suffer. Second. the 
estimated  benefits  of  the  labeling  program 
sho~11~1  be  studied  in  a  non-hypothetical  set- 
ting.  Research  has shown that consumers re- 
spond differently  when answering  hypotheti- 
cal survey questions that when making actual 
non-hypothetical  comments (Fox et a]). Fill-- 
ther, the short-run impacts of  such a program 
need to be assessed. Because the vast majority 
of  beef  is  currently  procluccd  with  added 
growth hormones, and it is likely that consun- 
ers are unaware of this fact, short-run denland 
may fall until price signals from consumers at 
the retail  level  can  be  relayed  to  cattle  pro- 
ducers. Finally, an interesting extension to this 
study would be to compare consumer demand 
for alternative  labeling  policies with  varying 
degrees of government involvement. Theoret- 
ically, consumers are assumed to  distrust pri- vate attempts to signal quality of credence at- 
tributes.  However, many food manufacturers 
regularly advertise quality credence attributes 
through  private  l~lbels,  which  indicates  that 
this assumption may he able to he relaxed in 
some circumstances. 
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